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Empirical estimation of critical points at which complex systems abruptly flip from
one state to another is among the remaining challenges in network science. However,
due to the stochastic nature of critical transitions it is widely believed that critical
points are difficult to estimate, and it is even more difficult, if not impossible, to pre-
dict the time such transitions occur [1–4]. We analyze a class of decaying dynamical
networks experiencing persistent attacks in which the magnitude of the attack is quan-
tified by the probability of an internal failure, and there is some chance that an internal
failure will be permanent. When the fraction of active neighbors declines to a critical
threshold, cascading failures trigger a network breakdown. For this class of network
we find both numerically and analytically that the time to the network breakdown,
equivalent to the network lifetime, is inversely dependent upon the magnitude of the
attack and logarithmically dependent on the threshold. We analyze how permanent
attacks affect dynamical network robustness and use the network lifetime as a mea-
sure of dynamical network robustness offering new methodological insight into system
dynamics.
PACS numbers: 89.75.Hc, 64.60.ah, 05.10.-a,05.40.-a
Despite being largely robust to outside attacks and
spontaneous fluctuations, during which a fraction of
nodes and links can become either temporarily or per-
manently dysfunctional [5–7], most real-world complex
systems ultimately collapse and thus have a finite life-
time. The collapse commonly occurs when, at a critical
point, the output of the system reaches a critical thresh-
old and the system abruptly shifts from one phase to
another [8–10]. Examples of real-world complex systems
that experience sudden collapse are numerous, e.g., the
spread of disease in living organisms [11], the spread of
political dissent in a human society, or the spread of a
product sales pattern in economics.
In recent years, network science has been utilized to
describe complex systems [12–21], and many dynamical
and temporal networks have been proposed [22–28] to
explain the complex dynamics that occur in real-world
networks [11]. However, the large majority of studies
on network science analysed separately either (a) net-
work robustness [5–7] or (b) empirical indicators of crit-
ical transitions [1–4, 9]. The latter group of studies fo-
cuses on a phenomenon known as critical slowing down,
where as the system approaches a critical point, corre-
lations and variance of the fluctuations increase. Here
for (a) and (b) we propose a common theoretical frame-
work based on early warning signals to predict a network
catastrophe (collapse). We focus on an important class of
networks characterized by nodes which flip between two
intrinsic states where nodes have the ability to control the
state of their neighbours. Examples for these networks
range from cascading processes in interdependent net-
works [12, 13], epidemic spreading in scale-free networks
[11], dynamical networks with spontaneous recovery [28]
to the glassy dynamics of kinetically constrained models
[29].
We find that introducing permanent failure produces
networks that are continuously decaying, but the decline
is continuous only up to a specific, critical point—the
network lifetime (tc)—when the network abruptly col-
lapses. We find that this critical point is logarithmically
dependent upon the threshold and inversely dependent
on the size of the outside attack.
Results. So far, no single network model has been
able to explain the process of finite-time decline with the
possibility of spontaneous collapse, how ageing or contin-
uous ongoing time-dependent attacks affects dynamical
network robustness, and how long a network can con-
tinue to function before it collapses or how to predict
the time of network collapse (tc) prior to its occurrence.
To address these three issues associated with dynamical
networks experiencing ongoing time-dependent attacks,
we propose a decaying mechanism in the evolution of a
network. We base this mechanism on three assumptions.
(i) The function of a node ni is dependent upon its
nearest neighbors. Generally speaking, a network is ro-
bust if its nodes are able to function even with a large
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2fraction of failed nearest neighbors, here denoted by Th.
If at time t the fraction of the active neighbors of node ni
is smaller than or equal to Th, at time t+ 1 node ni will
become externally inactive with a probability r. We use
a fractional threshold [30, 31], which is more appropriate
than the absolute threshold [28, 32] when networks have
heterogeneous degrees.
(ii) Each node can internally fail independent of other
nodes, with a probability p quantifying the magnitude of
the external attack. This dynamical case is equivalent to
the static network case when robustness is studied under
simultaneous random or targeted attack [5–7, 25, 33, 34].
(iii) Although we assume that a node can recover from
an internal failure after a finite period of time (τ) has
passed, because internal failure always carries the poten-
tial risk of being permanent, by 1 − q we define such
an event. Thus, due to ongoing time-dependent attacks,
when a network is attacked not every node will be able to
recover. As in Ref. [28], a node can be considered active
only if it is both internally and externally active. For
a more complicated network, that includes adding new
nodes and introduction of link failures, see Methods and
Model extensions.
Note that the dynamical approach used to quantify
the robustness of a network under time-dependent at-
tacks can also be used to address the ageing process. In
this case the probability p serves as an internal network
property [28]. Over time not every internally-failed node
can recover, e.g., at the cell level in biology there may be
a defective apoptotic process [35].
In seminal studies of the stability of large complex sys-
tems, Gardner and Ashby [36] (numerically) and May
[37] (analytically) examined how they maintain stabil-
ity up to some critical level of connectedness and then
suddenly, as the level of connectedness increases, become
unstable. In contrast, our focus is on the reverse process
in which a continuous decrease in the number of function-
ing nodes and links between them, over time decreases
network complexity. We describe the level of network
functionality in terms of the fraction of the total num-
ber of nodes that are continuing to function [28] and the
fraction of active links, fl [30].
To determine how Th and q affect network functional-
ity, we first generate three different random Erdo˝s Renyi
(ER) networks and scale-free networks (Barabasi-Albert
BA model), each with initial N(t = 0) = 10, 000 nodes
and an average degree 〈k〉 = 10. Then each network is
placed under persistent attack, quantified by p, where we
allow nodes in the inactive phase to permanently fail with
a probability 1−q. For varying values of q for each decay-
ing network, Fig. 1 shows the fraction of active nodes, the
fraction of active links, and the average degree, each as a
function of time. Figure 1 shows that when the thresh-
old is fixed but the values of q varied, the network decays
continuously until at some specific time tc it abruptly
and spontaneously collapses, a collapse brought on by
a sudden large increase in the number of inactive links
and nodes. Note that this sudden collapse does not re-
quire any parameter other than q. As expected, the more
rapid the exponential decay, the sooner the network will
collapse. When we compare the fractions of active nodes
and links we see that, when the network collapse occurs,
the fraction of active links decreases substantially more
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FIG. 1: Comparison between BA (solid line) and ER (dashed
line) decaying dynamical networks, when 〈k〉 = 10. Under
the same level of attack, quantified by equal p, the BA decay-
ing network exhibits the higher level of dynamical robustness
than the ER decaying network, where dynamical robustness
is quantified here by larger tc. For (a) the fractions of active
nodes and (b) links and (c) the average degree as a function of
time the BA decaying networks are more robust than the ER
decline networks. Here the robustness is defined in a dynam-
ical way—the more robust a network is, the longer it lasts.
For both networks we use p = 0.001, r = 0.8, Th = 0.5, and
τ = 50.
3than the fraction of active nodes, where the first fraction
approximately equals 1− r.
Note that our analysis addresses both how long a dy-
namical network will function before collapse and how
robust it will be under long-term continuous attack, i.e.,
the larger the network lifetime tc, the more robust the
network. The study of robustness of dynamic networks
under continuous attack is highly relevant to the concerns
of both researchers and practitioners. For instance, im-
portant goal of military science is determining how a mil-
itary network can remain robust under persistent enemy
attack; or a goal in finance is determining how a finan-
cial system can remain robust when a fraction of its banks
fails over time. References [5, 6] reported that scale-free
networks are more robust than ER networks to multiple
random and simultaneous attacks. Next we compare the
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(b) BA(6) q = 0, p2 = 1
ER(6) q = 0, p2 = 1
FIG. 2: Dynamical robustness of BA and ER decaying net-
works for different values of q, where tc serves as a measure of
dynamical robustness. We show tc versus p for (a) q = 0.995,
0.95− 0.995. The BA decaying networks exhibit higher level
of robustness than the ER decaying networks. We use r = 0.8
and 〈k〉= 6. (b) For BA and ER decaying dynamical networks
when a node cannot recover (q = 0), for 〈k〉 = 6 the larger
time tc (the larger dynamical robustness) we obtain for BA
decaying network than for ER decaying network. Here, the
larger time tc, the longer the network lasts, the more robust
the network.
robustness of decaying BA and ER networks.
Here the network robustness is defined in a dynamical
way, where the more robust a network is, the longer it
lasts. Figure 1 compares the dynamical robustness of de-
caying BA and ER networks under continuous long-term
attack, measured by p, as a function of time. We use the
same parameters for both types of networks. Using net-
work lifetime to quantify dynamical network robustness,
Fig. 1 shows that, even when nodes and links fail, BA net-
works are generally more robust than ER networks. A
dynamical BA network is typically able to survive with
higher values of tc than an ER network before it exhibits
an abrupt drop in the fraction of its active nodes and
links and its average degree. Figure 1(c) shows that for
the q values displayed, the average degree of a dynami-
cal BA network lasts longer (i.e., tc is larger) than the
average degree of a dynamical ER network.
To determine whether this difference in dynamical ro-
bustness is general or sample-dependent, we compare de-
caying BA and ER networks for different q values. For
fixed Th and r, and varying values of q, Fig. 2(a) shows
the relationship between tc, whose precise definition will
be explained in Fig. 4, and p. The BA decaying networks
generally exhibit a higher level of dynamical robustness
than the ER decaying networks. We find similar depen-
dence between tc and p for varying network degrees.
The dynamical approach also allows the non-trivial
possibility that, following an attack, nodes can remain
permanently damaged, corresponding to the q = 0 case
in which no recovery is allowed. This case is important
because it allows us to compare our results with studies
in which robustness is analysed in static networks un-
der either simultaneous random or targeted attack [5–
7, 25, 33, 34]. Note that when q = 0, the period τ be-
comes irrelevant. For a fixed Th = 0.5 and 〈k〉 = 6,
Fig. 2(b) shows how the time tc is affected by the level of
outside attack, quantified by p. Again as in Figure 2(a),
the larger the level of outside attack, the smaller the net-
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Th = 0.200
Th = 0.350
Th = 0.500
Th = 0.650
FIG. 3: Time of network crash tc versus the fraction of active
links for different values of the network threshold, Th calcu-
lated for BA dynamical network. tc dramatically depends on
Th.
4work lifetime. Because no recovery is allowed for this
case, the lifetime values in Fig. 2(b) are much smaller
than in Fig. 2(a). When q = 0, decaying BA networks ex-
hibit a significantly higher level of dynamical robustness
than decaying ER networks, and the times tc calculated
for BA networks are consistently larger than the times tc
calculated for ER networks—the dependence between tc
and p follows a hyperbolic function.
In the decaying network approach, as previously
stated, we quantify the network threshold in terms of
the fraction of failed nearest neighbors a node can sus-
tain and still work properly. If a node ni is initially linked
to 10 nodes and needs at least 6 active neighbors to func-
tion, then as the network decays node ni will die when
the number of its active neighbors drops to 5. Figure 3
shows a decaying BA network with fixed q and p. The
network lifetime tc is strongly dependent upon Th, e.g.,
when Th is decreased from 0.5 to 0.2, tc changes by a
factor of 10.
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FIG. 4: Indicators for network crash. Shown are 3 indicators
together with the fraction of active links obtained for (a) ER
and (b) BA decaying network when q = 0.99. We show indi-
cator I (mstd), moving standard deviation of fraction of active
nodes (forward method) with window size τ = 50 (the same
τ as in recovery process), and indicator II (crash indicator),
the average fraction of active neighbors in excess of thresh-
old Th. Approximately, when the average fraction of active
neighbors exceeds the threshold, cascading failures trigger a
network breakdown. The cascade lasts several decades. We
also show the analytical indicator III (tc). We use p = 0.003,
Th = 0.5, and r = 0.8.
In a complex dynamical system, thresholds and criti-
cal points control the transition process between differ-
ent states [38]. A phase transition occurs when a system
reaches a system threshold. Using this perspective, the
network decline and collapse numerically described above
can also be treated analytically. Note that at time t− τ ,
due to attacks, the network has N(t − τ) living nodes,
both active and inactive, among which pN(t − τ) nodes
switch to the internally inactive phase. The change in
the number of living nodes is proportional to the proba-
bility that a node which internally failed at t− τ will not
recover, 1− q, thus
dN(t− τ) = −(1− q)pN(t− τ)dt. (1)
The number of living nodes remaining is determined by
an exponential decay N(t) = N(0) exp(−(1− q)pt) with
a decay rate of λ = (1 − q)p, where N(t)/N(0) is the
average fraction of living nodes equivalent to the aver-
age fraction of living neighbors of each node. For sim-
plicity, let us assume that all nodes have the same ini-
tial degree k, remembering that node ni will be active
if the number of its functioning neighbors is larger than
m = Thk. At time t, the fraction of n
′
is failed neighboring
nodes Nf (t)/N(t) among N(t) living nodes previously es-
timated as k(t) = k exp(−(1−q)pt), can be approximated
using the probabilities of internal and external failures,
p and E[m, k(t)],
a ≡ a(p, r,m, k(t)) = p+ r(1− p)E[m, k(t)], (2)
where E[m, k(t)] = Σmj=0
(
k(t)
k(t)−j
)
ak(t)−j(1 − a)j . In the
above figures we analysed the ratio between the living
active and the initial number of nodes Na(t)/N(0), which
is equivalent to
fn ≡ Na(t)
N(t)
N(t)
N(0)
= (1− a) exp[−(1− q)pt]. (3)
Here exp[−(1 − q)pt] is due to the continuous decline
of the network, and 1 − a indicates the sudden network
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FIG. 5: For the varying q values, for both decaying ER and
decaying BA network we show the size of the decrease of fn
during the network crash, equal to Th − r.
5crash occurring when the fraction of living nodes k(t)/k
approaches the threshold Th = m/k. At this limit, from
Eqs. (2) and (3) we see that E[m, k(t)] → 1 and the
probability of external failure dominates p.
Although predictive power is important in any scien-
tific endeavour, it is widely assumed that predicting crit-
ical transitions is extremely difficult because any change
in the dynamic state of a system immediately prior to
reaching the critical point will be slight [9]. Unlike early-
warning indicators that utilize recent system outputs to
detect impending system collapse, we use past data to
estimate network parameters, from which we generate
numerical simulations that describe the network state at
any future time, including the moment of network failure
tc. Thus the dynamical approach allows us to precisely
predict the network crash.
Figure 4 shows the predictive power of this dynamical
approach when applied to both (a) ER and (b) BA net-
works in the process of decaying. It shows the fraction
of active nodes for time scales that include the network
crash and also two important values: (I) the standard
deviation of the fraction of active nodes calculated us-
ing moving boxes similar to the approach proposed in
Ref. [9] and (II) the average fraction of active neighbors—
active both internally and externally—above the thresh-
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FIG. 6: Statistics of indicator III for (a) decaying ER and (b)
decaying BA network. We show how the first four moments
of indicator III change over time just before, during and just
after the crash. Just before the network crash, skewness and
kurtosis dramatically and abruptly increase.
old Th. Equations (2) and (3) provide a theoretical ex-
planation for II, predicting that when the fraction of cur-
rently living nodes approaches the threshold that controls
the external failures, the probability of critical transi-
tion increases and finally cascading failures lasting sev-
eral decades trigger a network breakdown. Note that just
prior to network crash, indicator I increases substantially
and thus is an indicator of impending failure and a predic-
tor of the time tc, i.e., it predicts when network failure
will occur. Reference [9] suggests that as a dynamical
system approaches a critical threshold its state at any
given moment increasingly resembles its previous state,
implying an increase in variance and autocorrelation as
reported for dynamical networks in Ref. [30]. We find
that this predictive power holds for both BA and ER
decaying networks for a wide variety of parameters. In
Fig. 4 the values of II shift from positive to negative and
the time when this occurs can also be used as a predictor
of the time of network collapse tc. In addition to the two
numerical indicators, we also suggest a third analytical
indicator (III), obtained by equating exp[−(1 − q)pt] in
Eq. (3) with Th,
tc = − ln(Th)/p(1− q). (4)
In the decaying network approach, the proportional
threshold Th controls both node-level crashes and
“macro” network-level crashes, which makes Th a break-
down threshold. For a general set of network parame-
ters, the time of network failure is the ratio between the
closeness of the fraction of active nodes to the threshold,
− ln(Th) and the rapidity of the approach of the frac-
tion to the threshold p(1− q). In Figs. 4(a) and 4(b) we
see that tc typically corresponds to the beginning of the
network failure. Additionally, for varying values of q in
Fig. 5, for both decaying BA and ER networks, we find
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FIG. 7: Distribution of the fraction of active neighbors of each
node above the threshold Th substantially changes during the
network failure.
6how much the fraction of active nodes decreases during
the network crash. It decreases for Th − r.
Figures (1) through (4) show that Eq. (4) agrees well
with the numerical results that describe how tc is affected
by Th, p, and q. Figures 4(a) and 4(b) show that the val-
ues of indicators II and III are nearly identical, suggesting
that during a network crash the time when the fraction
of living nodes approaches the threshold is approximately
identical to the time when the fraction of active neigh-
boring nodes approaches the threshold, implying that in
Eq. (3) the second term contributes significantly more
than the first. Further we find that the time series of
the fraction of active neighbors of each node above the
threshold Th substantially changes over time. For this
time series, calculated for each network in Figs. 4(a) and
4(b) in addition to the average representing our indica-
tor III, Fig. 6(a)-(b) shows the higher moments, variance,
skewness, and kurtosis. For different times prior, during,
and after the network failure, Fig. 7 shows the distribu-
tion of the fraction of active neighbors of each node above
the threshold Th. Just prior to network failure, skewness
and kurtosis and the distribution dramatically change.
In estimating the time of a future network crash, we
calculate network parameters from its creation at time
t = 0 to some time t during which the fraction of active
nodes fn decreases from 1 to some value f
′. When we
numerically generate the network we thus record the time
t at which fn reaches f
′. Then the true prediction of fu-
ture network collapse is not tc but tc−t, i.e., tc represents
the entire lifetime of the network, and our interest is in
estimating the lifetime remaining after t.
Conclusion. In both the natural and social sciences a
wide range of real-world complex networks have a finite
lifetime characterized by abrupt shifts between phases.
One of the differences between the behaviour of natural
systems and social systems near a critical point is that the
sudden random change commonly occurs at a fixed point
in natural systems [39]. In contrast, in social sciences
even a critical point is a random variable and, although
there is an expectation that some radical change is im-
minently probable, it is generally assumed that it is not
possible to predict the exact time of its occurrence. We
have explored the predictive power for a particular class
of dynamic non-equilibrium decaying networks.
In our network model, the same parameter, a propor-
tional threshold Th responsible for node-level crashes,
also controls “macro” network-level crashes. Our dy-
namical network study includes cases in which nodes can
recover (q 6= 0) or remain in a failed state (q = 0) af-
ter a failure caused by the ageing process or by severe
hostile time-dependent attacks. Model extensions are in-
cluded in the Methods section. How successful our net-
work might be when applied in practice depends first, on
how capable we are to estimate the model parameters, es-
pecially the critical threshold [40], and second, how good
our network is as a proxy for a real-world complex sys-
tem. In practice the second issue is very frequent when
real-world stochastic systems composed of large number
of units, such as financial, are modelled with theoretical
stochastic processes, such as multivariate autoregressive
for instance. Besides, real-world networks rather inter-
act with other networks [12, 13] than act as a single net-
work [41]. Due to interdependencies between different
networks, a shock on a particular network may change
not only its own network parameters, but also the pa-
rameters of all other networks. Clearly, since the time
to the network breakdown depends on network parame-
ters, any change in network parameters also affects our
estimation on the timing of network collapse.
Methods and Model Extensions
Phase-flipping with decay Ref. [28] reported that
introduction of both dynamical recovery and stochas-
tic contiguous spreading leads to spontaneous collective
network phase-flipping phenomena. For q = 1 case,
we choose the network parameter set to enable phase-
flipping between two stable states. When decay mech-
anism is included (q 6= 1), in Fig. 8 with decreasing
parameter q, the fraction of living nodes gradually dis-
appears over time and so the phase-flipping phenomena
and collective network mode.
Introduction of link failures. For decaying net-
works, it is reasonably to assume that links as well as
nodes may also fail at any time t. Thus, we additionally
consider that every link ` can independently fail with
probability p` (internal failures in links). We define that
a link is “healthy” (active) if it is active both internally,
controlled by p`, and externally, controlled by p in (ii).
When a dynamical network is defined one should find
out which part of the parameter space is characteristic
for a stable network regime and which part of the space
determines an unstable network regime. For our dynam-
ical network defined by three probability parameters, p,
r, and p`, next, for a case when nodes always recover
after being inactive for a while (q = 1), we provide an-
alytical results for the 3D hysteresis in parameter space
here enclosed by manyfolds comprising spinodals which
separate regions of stability and instability. Thus, for an
active node i with ki neighbors, the link between ni and
another node nj fails either due to an internal link failure
(X) with probability p` or due to external failure of node
j (Y ) equal to a—in the latter case according to defini-
tion, when nj is failed, all its links have failed. Thus,
assuming X and Y are independent, the link is active
with probability (1− a)(1− p`) and accordingly inactive
with probability 1− (1− a)(1− p`) = a+ p` − ap` ≡ a`.
Similar to (i), now when even the links can fail inter-
nally, we define that node ni is active only if there are
more than m active links (not nodes as in (i)). Thus by
E(k,m, a`) ≡ Σmj=0ak−j` (1− a`)j
(
k
k − j
)
, (5)
we define the probability that node ni’s neighborhood
7is critically damaged with more than m broken links.
Finally, we derive the probability that a randomly chosen
node ni with degree k is inactive, equal to the fraction of
inactive nodes,
ak ≡ a = p+ r(1− p)E(k,m, a`), (6)
where we apply probability theory P (X ∪ Y ) = P (X) +
P (Y )− P (X)P (Y ) for two independent events. Clearly,
this equation is derived under the assumption of indepen-
dence of the external and internal failures is only approxi-
mately true since internal failures affect external failures.
For an ER decaying network. Fig. 9 shows the predictive
power for a case when internal link failures are consid-
ered.
For simplicity for the moment we analyze random reg-
ular networks since Eq. (6) assumes that all nodes have
the same degree. Fig. 10 shows the mean-field (MFT)
prediction for the position of spinodals in 3D parame-
ter space (p1, p2 ≡ r, p3 ≡ p`) obtained from Eq. (6),
where p1 = 1 − exp(−pτ) [28]. In 3D parameter space,
the 3D hysteresis region is enclosed by planes compris-
ing spinodals. The 3D space is obtained by fixing p` and
calculating the 2D hysteresis region bounded with two
spinodals merging at a critical point.
Addition of new nodes. In the growth of a network,
the model can be additionally extended in a way that
nodes can be also created not only destroyed. We can
assume that at each time t, among N(t) living nodes,
each living node can create a new node with probability
p′. Then Eq. (1) is modified to
dN(t− τ) = (p′ − (1− q)p)N(t− τ)dt, (7)
and the system can not only exponentially decay, but also
increase and even stay stable if p′ = (1− q)p.
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